A new procedure to help system/network administrators identify multiple rootkit infections by Lobo, Desmond et al.
A New Procedure to Help System/Network Administrators 
Identify Multiple Rootkit Infections 
Desmond Lobo, Paul Watters and Xin-Wen Wu 
Internet Commerce Security Laboratory 
University of Ballarat 
Ballarat, Australia 
desmondlobo@students.ballarat.edu.au, {p.watters, x.wu}@ballarat.edu.au 
 
 
Abstract— Rootkits refer to software that is used to hide the 
presence of malware from system/network administrators and 
permit an attacker to take control of a computer. In our 
previous work, we designed a system that would categorize 
rootkits based on the hooks that had been created. Focusing on 
rootkits that use inline function hooking techniques, we showed 
that our system could successfully categorize a sample of 
rootkits using unsupervised EM clustering. 
In this paper, we extend our previous work by outlining a new 
procedure to help system/network administrators identify the 
rootkits that have infected their machines. Using a logistic 
regression model for profiling families of rootkits, we were able 
to identify at least one of the rootkits that had infected each of 
the systems that we tested.  
Keywords- network security; malware; rootkits; logistic 
regression; profiling 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When some malicious software (malware) manages to 
infiltrate a computer network, it can then spread throughout 
the network, infecting the computers connected to it. The 
writers of these types of software have moved away from 
creating malware for fun and have started developing code 
with the intention of huge financial gains. We are no longer 
dealing with script kiddies just trying to create havoc, but 
instead are targeted by organized criminal gangs that are 
deploying advanced forms of malware, with rootkit 
capabilities, on the Internet. It is estimated that 85% of 
malicious code is being written today with the goal of 
creating profit for the malware’s author [1].  
Rootkits refer to software that is used to hide the 
presence of malware (such as viruses, worms and trojans) 
from system/network administrators and permit an attacker 
to take control of a computer system [2]. In fact, installing a 
rootkit is usually the first thing that an attacker will do after 
gaining access to a system [3]. This will ensure that the 
attacker will remain undetected. 
There exist many different types of rootkits. In this the 
initial phase of our research, we focus strictly on rootkits that 
use inline function hooking techniques [4], but plan to 
include other types of rootkits in the later stages of our work. 
There are several tools available, such as McAfee’s 
Rootkit Detective, which can be used to detect the inline 
function hooks that have been created by one or more 
rootkits on a computer system. Even with this knowledge, 
however, it is still not possible to determine what rootkits 
have infected the machine. Each time a tool such as the 
Rootkit Detective is run, a log file is generated that contains 
a list of the detected hooks.  The amount of data in these log 
files is overwhelming as they often contain thousands of 
lines of text, several lines for each detected hook. Figure 1 is 
an extract from one of these log files. This data represents 
just three of the many inline function hooks that had been 
created by a Berbew rootkit. 
The main contribution of this paper is that we have 
devised a new procedure that will help system/network 
administrators make sense of the vast amount of data in these 
log files. This procedure will help these administrators 
identify the rootkits that have infected their computers. It is a 
two-step process and these steps are described in sections II 
and III. A discussion of some of the related work is provided 
in section IV. This is followed by an outline of our future 
work in section V and a conclusion to the paper in 
section VI.  
 
 
McAfee(R) Rootkit Detective 1.1 scan report 
On 16-08-2009 at 03:41:08 
OS-Version 5.1.2600 
Service Pack 3.0 
 
==================================== 
 
Object-Type: IAT/EAT-hook 
PID: 2604 
Details: Export : Function  : kernel32.dll!Process32Next => 
C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll:7C80029C 
Object-Path: C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll 
Status: Hooked 
 
Object-Type: IAT/EAT-hook 
PID: 2412 
Details: Export : Function  : ADVAPI32.dll!RegEnumValueW => 
C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll:77DD04B4 
Object-Path: C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll 
Status: Hooked 
 
Object-Type: IAT/EAT-hook 
PID: 2252 
Details: Export : Function  : ntdll.dll!ZwQuerySystemInformation 
=> C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll:7C90027C 
Object-Path: C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll 
Status: Hooked 
 
Figure 1.  Inline Function Hooks 
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TABLE I.  RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT ONE 
Antivirus Labels Family Number of Samples 
ClamAV Worm.Korgo.Z 
BitDefender Backdoor.Berbew.Be.DAM F1 21 
ClamAV Trojan.Crypted-29 
FProt W32.Berbew.F F2 13 
ClamAV Trojan.Crypted-29 
FProt W32.Berbew.G F2 11 
ClamAV Trojan.Qukart-8 
FProt W32.Berbew.F F2 1 
ClamAV Trojan.Qukart-10 
FProt W32.Berbew.F F2 1 
ClamAV Trojan.Qukart-17 
FProt W32.Berbew.F F2 1 
ClamAV Trojan.Crypted-28 
AVGScan I-Worm.Nuwar.N 
FProt W32.Berbew.F 
F2 6 
ClamAV Trojan.Crypted-28 
BitDefender Trojan.Spy.Qukart.Z 
FProt W32.Berbew.G 
F2 2 
ClamAV Trojan.Bancos-6278 F3 2 
ClamAV Worm.Feebs.AE 
BitDefender Win32.Worm.Feebs.1.Gen F4 14 
Kaspersky Worm.Win32.Feebs.a F4 1 
BitDefender Trojan.PWS.Papras.A F5 1 
BitDefender Trojan.PWS.Papras.O F5 1 
BitDefender Trojan.PWS.Papras.F F5 1 
BitDefender Trojan.PWS.Papras.L F5 2 
 
II. OUR PREVIOUS WORK 
The procedure to identify the rootkits that have infected a 
machine is a two step process. In our previous work [5], we 
described the first step, our first experiment, which involved 
the categorizing of a sample of rootkits into several groups 
based on the inline function hooks that had been created by 
each of these rootkits. 
Having obtained and tested 78 rootkit samples, we found 
that a total of 11,159 inline function hooks had been created. 
Based on the particular hooks that had been created by each 
rootkit and using the unsupervised EM clustering algorithm, 
we were then able to categorize the samples into groups. 
The clustering algorithm calculated the optimum number 
of clusters to be five and generated the following results. The 
78 rootkit samples were clustered into these five groups: 
 
• There were a total of 21 samples in the first group, 
which will subsequently be referred to as family F1. 
• There were a total of 35 samples in the second 
group, which will subsequently be referred to as 
family F2. 
• There were a total of 2 samples in the third group, 
which will subsequently be referred to as family F3. 
• There were a total of 15 samples in the fourth group, 
which will subsequently be referred to as family F4. 
• There were a total of 5 samples in the fifth group, 
which will subsequently be referred to as family F5. 
The next thing to do was to validate these results: had our 
system generated meaningful clusters? To answer this 
question, we proceeded by labeling the rootkit samples using 
several different antivirus scanners. 
The rootkit samples for our experiment had all been 
obtained from the Offensive Computing website 
(http://www.offensivecomputing.net). This website uses the 
following five antivirus scanners to label their malware 
samples: 
FProt 
BitDefender 
Kaspersky 
ClamAV 
AVGScan 
 
The 78 samples that we had obtained from this website had 
each been labeled by at least one of these antivirus scanners.  
 
• The 21 samples in family F1 had something in 
common: they had all been labeled as Berbew by the 
BitDefender antivirus scanner. 
• The 35 samples in family F2 had something in 
common: they had all been labeled as Berbew by the 
FProt antivirus scanner. 
• The 2 samples in family F3 had something in 
common: they had both been labeled as Bancos. 
• The 15 samples in family F4 had something in 
common: they had all been labeled as Feebs. 
• The 5 samples in family F5 had something in 
common: they had all been labeled as Papras. 
 
Given that the samples within each family had something 
in common, we concluded that the results that had been 
generated by the EM clustering algorithm, which are 
summarized in Table I, were very reasonable. In essence, we 
showed that our system could be used to successfully 
categorize a sample of rootkits that use inline function 
hooking techniques. 
III. TESTING MULTIPLE ROOTKIT INFECTIONS 
When conducting our first experiment, we had tested just 
one rootkit sample at a time on a clean system, and then 
restored the system back to a clean state before testing the 
next sample. In reality, though, it is often the case that a 
machine is found with more than one infection. Thus, in our 
second experiment, the second step in the process, we 
wanted to determine if our identification technique could 
handle the situation in which more than one rootkit was 
running on the system. 
We proceeded as follows. The dataset for our first 
experiment had consisted of 78 instances (one instance for 
each rootkit) and 1560 attributes for each instance. The 1560 
attributes had contained binary values and represented the 
1560 hooks that we had tested, with a positive value for a 
certain attribute meaning that that particular hook was 
present. As mentioned, we had managed to cluster the 78 
rootkits into five families using these attributes.  
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Figure 2.  Linear Probability Versus Logistic Regression [6] 
For our second experiment, we added one more attribute 
to our dataset. This 1561st attribute, which we will call a 
marker, contained the name of the family that the rootkit 
belonged to. 
A. Logistic Regression 
Having a marker for each of the 78 instances, we then 
made use of a logistic regression model for profiling the 
families of rootkits. We used this particular model since it 
can be used in data (where the family is known) to find 
similarities between the instances within each family [7]. In 
other words, we used this model to find the attributes that 
could be used to differentiate between the different families 
of rootkits.  
In a linear probability model, the data is fitted to a straight 
line, but this type of model is not always appropriate. For 
logistic regression, on the other hand, an S-shaped curve is 
used instead. This is illustrated in Figure 2. An advantage of 
such an S-shaped curve is that it gives you a value between 0 
and 1, and this can be interpreted as the probability of 
belonging to a certain family [8]. Cutoff values are 
established to determine if an instance belongs to a particular 
family [7]. 
The probability function that is used to determine the 
acceptance of an instance i to a family j is given by the 
formula 
)( 01
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where the β coefficients are calculated using Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) [9]. The Xi variables contain 
binary 0/1 values and represent the attributes for each of the 
instances. 
B. Results 
The logistic regression model was available for 
implementation in the Wakaito Environment for Knowledge 
Analysis (WEKA) [10]. The results after applying the model 
are illustrated in Figure 3. We found that: 
• Attribute 313 could be used to identify a rootkit from 
family F1 
• Attribute 1423 could be used to identify a rootkit 
from family F2 
• Attribute 4 could be used to identify a rootkit from 
family F3 
• Attribute 970 could be used to identify a rootkit from 
family F4 
• Attribute 24 could be used to identify a rootkit from 
family F5 
 
Having many attributes and just a handful of families, it 
was not surprising that we could identify each family using 
just one particular attribute. Thus, in this case, it was fairly 
straightforward; this same logistic regression model could, 
however, even be used in more complex circumstances.  
Next, we tested our system’s ability to detect multiple 
rootkit infections by trying many different combinations of 
rootkits. The results of these tests are summarized in Table II 
and a brief explanation of these results follows. 
The second row of the table displays the results of a test in 
which the machine was infected with two rootkits, one from 
family F4 and then one from family F5, and our system 
managed to identify both families. On the other hand, the 
fourth row of the table displays the results of a test in which 
the machine was again infected with two rootkits, this time 
one from family F1 and then one from family F2, but our 
system only managed to identify the rootkit from family F1. 
It should be pointed out that we used identical rootkit 
samples for each test within a group. So, for example, for 
group 1, we first picked a rootkit from family F4 and then 
one from family F5. For the following test, we used the same 
rootkits but just reversed the order.  
It should also be noted that when testing more than one 
rootkit on our system, we found that certain combinations of 
rootkits caused our system to crash.  
Based on our experimental results in Table II, we drew 
the following conclusions: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Attributes that Identify each Family 
F5
F4 
F3
F1 F2 
●
● ● 
●
● 
Attribute 313 Attribute 1423
Attribute 24 Attribute 970 Attribute 4
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TABLE II.  RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT TWO 
Group 1st 2nd 3rd Attr. 313 
Attr. 
1423 
Attr. 
4 
Attr. 
970 
Attr. 
24 
1 F4 F5 - 8 8 8 9 9 
1 F5 F4 - 8 8 8 9 9 
2 F1 F2 - 9 8 8 8 8 
2 F2 F1 - 9 8 8 8 8 
3 F3 F4 - 8 8 9 9 8 
3 F4 F3 - 8 8 9 9 8 
4 F1 F5 - 9 8 8 8 9 
4 F5 F1 - 9 8 8 8 9 
5 F2 F5 - 8 8 8 8 9 
5 F5 F2 - 8 8 8 8 9 
6 F1 F4 - 9 8 8 9 8 
6 F4 F1 - 9 8 8 9 8 
7 F2 F4 - 8 9 8 9 8 
7 F4 F2 - 8 9 8 9 8 
8 F2 F3 - 8 9 8 8 8 
8 F3 F2 - 8 9 9 8 8 
9 F4 F1 F5 9 8 8 9 9 
9 F5 F4 F1 9 8 8 9 9 
9 F1 F5 F4 9 8 8 9 9 
10 F2 F3 F1 9 8 8 8 8 
10 F1 F2 F3 9 8 8 8 8 
10 F3 F1 F2 9 8 8 8 8 
11 F1 F2 F4 9 8 8 9 8 
11 F4 F2 F1 9 8 8 9 8 
11 F2 F4 F1 9 8 8 9 8 
 
1. When we had a system with more that one rootkit 
infection, we were able to identify the family of at 
least one of the rootkits that had infected the system. 
 
2. The order that the rootkits were executed does, in 
some cases, make a difference. After observing the 
results of testing rootkits from group 8, it seems that 
the rootkit that is executed first does appear to get 
the upper hand. 
 
We hope that system/network administrators might 
benefit from this system. If an administrator detects some 
inline function hooks on a particular network machine, he or 
she could then use our identification procedure to determine 
the family of at least one of the rootkits that had created the 
hooks. Armed with that knowledge, the administrator could 
then proceed and take further action.  
IV. RELATED WORK 
Kolter et al. [11] extracted n-grams from malware samples 
and then tried to classify the samples into families. Like our 
work, they also made use of the WEKA data mining 
software package to analyze their datasets. Their approach, 
however, involved a static analysis of the malicious 
executable files, while our strategy was to dynamically 
analyze a live system to identify the rootkit infections. 
Bayer et al. [12] collected malware samples and then 
performed a dynamic analysis of each sample in a controlled 
environment, eventually ending up with clusters of families. 
The objective of their research was to cluster malware 
samples based on the behavior of each sample. Bailey et al. 
[13] also carried out dynamic analyses of malware samples 
by executing each sample in a virtualized environment. They 
too categorized the malware samples into groups based on 
the malware’s behavior. Our approach was similar to that of 
Bayer et al. and Bailey et al., but more focused. Instead of 
analyzing all types of malware, we concentrated exclusively 
on rootkits and used the inline function hooks that had been 
created by these rootkits to differentiate between the various 
families. 
There has been some previous research that also used data 
mining techniques for profiling. Fawcett and Provost [14] 
designed an automatic method to detect fraudulent usage of 
cellular telephones, and this was based on the profiling of 
customer behavior using rule-based data mining methods. 
They first combed through their data in search of indicators 
of fraud. Rules were then established that could distinguish 
fraudulent calls from legitimate calls. 
Huntington et al. [15] attempted to distinguish between 
the various groups of users that sought information about 
health on the Web. They profiled users based on the health 
sites that they visited. A logistic regression model was used 
to determine which site attributes could be used to identify 
the different user groups. 
The work of Pepyne et al. [16] is most closely related to 
ours in the sense that they too applied logistic regression 
profiling techniques to the area of network security. Pepyne 
et al. attempted to profile computer users based on the 
temporal aspects of their behavior. If an individual’s 
behavior deviated significantly from his or her group’s 
profile, then there would be grounds for further inspection. 
For our work, we too made use of a logistic regression 
model for profiling. Our strategy was unique, however, in 
that we devised a new procedure to use the profiles of rootkit 
families to identify the rootkits on a live system. 
V. FUTURE WORK 
This research focused strictly on rootkits that use inline 
function hooking techniques. As mentioned earlier, we plan 
to include other types of rootkits in the next stage of our 
work; in particular, we plan to analyze rootkits that hook the 
import address tables (IATs), export address tables (EATs) 
and system service descriptor tables (SSDTs). 
Having a large and sparse dataset, we also plan to look 
into the possibility of using techniques from principal 
components analysis (PCA) for our study. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
When malware manages to penetrate a computer network 
and jump from machine to machine, it can create a lot of 
difficulty for the system/network administrator. The 
emergence and proliferation of rootkits, which are used to 
hide the presence and activity of malware, are only going to 
make this problem worse.  
In this paper, we focused on rootkits that use inline 
function hooking techniques to remain hidden. There are 
several tools available, such as McAfee’s Rootkit Detective, 
that can be used to find the hooks that have been created on a 
system, but these tools cannot be used to identify the 
rootkits.  
The most important contribution of this paper is that we 
have developed a new procedure that will help 
system/network administrators identify the rootkits that have 
infected their machines. We used a logistic regression model 
for profiling the rootkit families and then determined which 
attributes could be used to differentiate between the various 
families.  
After testing several systems that had been infected with 
more that one rootkit, we found that we could identify at 
least one of the rootkit families. This knowledge would 
certainly help the administrator in deciding how to proceed.   
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